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Abstract
Prior literature provides conflicting evidence about the impact of speculation
on gold futures returns, volatility, and the relationship between market fun-
damentals and prices. In this paper, we exploit trade volume information to
determine the most appropriate family of factors to adopt when modelling
gold futures. Using the Disaggregated Commitment of Traders report, we
find that extreme levels of speculation are informative in that they signify a
shift in the relative modelling accuracy of macroeconomic and latent factors.
A simple composite prediction framework, incorporating the changing level
of speculation, empirically demonstrates the uncovered phenomenon and of-
fers improved predictive accuracy for gold futures prices. Furthermore, our
findings are shown to be robust to alternative latent and macroeconomic
model specifications.
1 Introduction
The role played by speculation as a driver in financial markets has received
widespread attention in the last decade, most notably in the debate surrounding
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commodity price spikes, which has led to calls for increased regulation of spe-
culative activity.1 This debate is closely related to the recent financialization of
commodity markets following the discovery of a negative correlation between com-
modity returns and stock returns (Greer, 2000; Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2006;
Erb and Harvey, 2006; Tang and Xiong, 2012). A popular view, is that increased fi-
nancialization has enabled commodity markets to become a new ‘investment class’,
allowing speculation to become a major price determinant, and resulting in incre-
ased volatility that cannot be explained by changes in economic fundamentals.2
Although there is much opposition to this view, a divorce of fundamentals from
markets could have important implications for our ability to accurately explain
commodity prices, with knock-on effects for producers, consumers and investors.
Gold, which has experienced a price increase of over 100% during our 2006-
2018 sample period but has shown a relative lack of volatility, has received little
attention in relation to the impact of speculation. This is despite its centuries-
old position as an important investment asset negatively correlated with stock
markets. The importance of gold is mirrored in its turnover, with the London
Bullion Market Association reporting an average daily gold trading volume in
London of US$26bn in 2017, while the average worldwide daily trading volume is
35% greater than all of the stocks in the S&P 500 combined.3 Jordan et al. (2017)
further show that gold is such an important and integrated component of modern
financial markets that it successfully supplements forecasts of G7 stock market
indices. Additionally, gold does not suffer from extreme supply swings like energy
and agricultural commodities, reducing the opportunity for speculative bubbles
(Bertus and Stanhouse, 2001), and making it an interesting comparator to studies
on the effects of speculation in these markets.
Since the seminal work of Friedman (1953), which suggests that speculation is
stabilising, as profitable speculation must involve buying when the price is low and
selling when the price is high, a strand of literature has emerged seeking to extract
information about who trades. Early literature highlights positive outcomes asso-
1
The Economist, “Of Mice and Markets”, 10 September 2016; The Economist, “Tying the
hands of speculators”, 19 October 2011; The Economist, “Pure Speculation”, 23 June 2008; The
Financial Times, “Commodity speculation must be curbed”, 25 July 2008.
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ciated with speculators who by definition are not constrained in terms of how they
trade. For instance, De Long et al. (1990) and Rahi and Zigrand (2009) show that
the presence of such rational arbitrageurs eliminates pricing distortions. Brunetti
et al. (2016) find no evidence that speculators destabilize financial markets and
find instead that speculative trading reduces volatility in oil, natural gas and corn
futures. Knittel and Pindyck (2016) show that speculation had little, if any, effect
on prices and volatility in oil markets between 1999 and 2012. Kim (2015) finds
that across a range of commodity futures including gold, speculation is not rela-
ted to large price changes. Additionally, for energy and agricultural commodity
futures, Kim (2015) finds that speculation either has no effect, or, contributes to
lower spot price volatility, and improved efficiency and liquidity.
There has been some empirical support for the view that high and volatile
commodity prices are, in part, a result of speculation. Singleton (2014) argues
that speculative activity associated with informational frictions may result in price
booms and busts. Examining the price impact of speculation in precious metals
futures between 2006 and 2013, Bosch and Pradkhan (2015) find no short-term
impact on returns or return volatility, but they do not rule out the possibility of
a long-term destabilising effect of speculation. The potential effects of speculative
trading on prices extends to the theory that periods of speculation can drive prices
away from fundamental values. Shleifer and Summers (1990) show that prices can
be affected by investors’ actions that are not fully justified by fundamental news.
Webb (2012) also outlines that there are price changes in speculative markets
that are entirely trading induced, and cannot be explained by new fundamental
information. Specifically in gold futures markets, Smales (2014) demonstrates that
the relationship between news and returns is affected by levels of speculation, while
Bertus and Stanhouse (2001) show that speculation can cause rational deviation
of prices from fundamentals in gold, as the expectation of price changes results in
actual price changes irrespective of underlying fundamental drivers.
This suggests that speculative trading can introduce new dynamics into mar-
kets that influence the relationship between fundamental variables and prices.
Which, whether stabilising or destabilising, may have important implications for
our ability to accurately model prices. Therefore, in this paper, we examine whet-
her the level of speculation affects the ability of fundamental macroeconomic fac-
tors to explain prices in the gold futures market from 2006-2018. Going beyond
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the independent use of macroeconomic drivers to characterise gold futures prices,
we test both observable fundamental macroeconomic factors and unconstrained la-
tent principal component factors. Empirically, we show that fundamental factors
are not capable, relative to latent factors, of capturing the additional dynamics
attributable to an elevated level of speculative activity in gold futures markets.
This is further exhibited through a composite prediction framework that uses spe-
culation to inform factor inclusion, resulting in significantly improved modelling
precision.
These findings contribute to the debate examining the effect of speculation on
gold markets (Kim, 2015; Bosch and Pradkhan, 2015; Andreasson et al., 2016),
and specifically, support the findings of Smales (2014) and Bertus and Stanhouse
(2001) that speculation can drive prices in the gold market away from their funda-
mentals. Our findings also add to the literature that attempts to go beyond fun-
damental macroeconomic factors and use Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
to model prices in commodity and gold markets (Ulrich, 2000; Daskalaki et al.,
2014; Gogolin and Kearney, 2016). Using an aggregated measure of speculation
calculated from the Commitment of Traders Report, Gogolin and Kearney (2016)
show that PCA does a better job than macroeconomic factors in explaining price
movements during high levels of speculation in oil futures. However, Fattouh et
al. (2013) highlight potential problems when using aggregated data to study the
question of speculation. Our findings add to that of Gogolin and Kearney (2016),
by suggesting that speculation affects the informational content of fundamental
variables even in the inherently less speculative gold market (Bertus and Stan-
house, 2001), and when using the more granular Disaggregated Commitment of
Traders Report when calculating levels of speculation. Interestingly, we also find
that increased speculation correlates with decreased price volatility, supporting
the findings of Brunetti et al. (2016) and Kim (2015) for energy and agricultu-
ral markets, but contrary to the suggestions of Bosch and Pradkhan (2015) for
precious metals and the assumptions made by Gogolin and Kearney (2016) for oil
futures. These results indicate that high levels of speculation can lead to prices
that are more stable than fundamentals are able to fully explain, and under these
conditions, PCA does a better job at accounting for these added dynamics.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains our methodology and data
sources. Section 3 presents and discusses our empirical results. In Section 4, we
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test the sensitivity of our results to alternative specifications. Section 5 provides
a brief summary and suggestions for further research.
2 Methodology
This paper seeks to compare the modelling accuracy of two distinct families
of factors in gold futures markets. To this end, we begin with the approach of
Gogolin and Kearney (2016) by constructing structurally similar integrated models
comprised of principal component and macroeconomic factors. Our methodology
extends that of Gogolin and Kearney (2016), who consider crude oil contracts.
This includes, considering alternative macroeconomic and principal component
specifications; using the more granular Disaggregated Commitment of Traders
Report when calculating levels of speculation; and by extracting data only on
days that the Disaggregated Commitment of Traders Report is released, to avoid
assuming constant speculation across the week. Firstly, we specify the following
statistical model with three principal components:
GCτt = α+ β1F1t−1 + β2F2t−1 + β3F3t−1 + εt,
with F1, F2 and F3 denoting the first, second and third principal components
calculated from the gold futures prices, and GC denoting the log return of con-
tinuous gold futures (GC) with maturity τ at time t. We hereafter refer to this
model as PC. PCA models do not require à priori specification of factors, enabling
the detection of any factor that may be used as a candidate for pricing commodity
returns (Daskalaki et al., 2014). We use three principal components here in line
with Ulrich (2000). In Ulrich (2000) the modes of fluctuations for the gold futu-
res price curve are captured using principal component decomposition with three
components retained. Ulrich (2000) states that the first is associated with gold
futures price level, the second mode is associated with the slope of the futures
price curve, and the third is associated with changes in its curvature. However,
the three principal components will capture any three factors that explain prices
most accurately. In Section 4 we also test for robustness to alternative numbers
of retained components, i.e., retaining one and two principal components. Further
details of the PCA implementation are provided in Section 2.1.
Secondly, based on commodity futures fundamental factors outlined in Andre-
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asson et al. (2016), a similar linear model for gold futures returns is constructed:
GCτt = α+ β1 SP500t−1 + β2 V IXt−1 + β3 USDt−1 + β4 EcPolt−1 + εt,
with SP500 denoting S&P500 log return, V IX denoting VIX volatility index log
change, USD denoting the trade weighted US dollar index change; and EcPol
denoting US economic policy uncertainty index log change. We hereafter refer
to this model as Macro. This paper aims to compare the families of factors in
differing speculative environments, not to prescribe specific fundamental factors
that drive the price of gold. Andreasson et al. (2016) argue that the above model
applies across all commodity futures, so we adopt these general fundamental fac-
tors. However, in Section 4 we also consider an alternative macro model, including
additional gold specific factors identified by O’Connor et al. (2015).
Changes in speculative activity are gauged through the adoption of the Wor-
king’s T (1960) ratio, expressed as follows:
W = 1 +
SS
HL+HS
if HS ≥ HL
W = 1 +
SL
HL+HS
if HS < HL
where SS (SL) is the open interest of speculators holding net short (long) po-
sitions, and HS (HL) is the open interest of hedgers holding net short (long)
positions. The motivating rationale for the ratio is that speculators are necessary
only insofar as they represent a counterparty for hedgers. The Working’s T (1960)
ratio should be interpreted as a proxy, and not a precise measure of speculative
activity, due to non-reportable positions and possible trader misclassification, i.e.,
commercials engaging in speculative activity. Values in the Working’s T (1960) 50-
90th percentile range are used to indicate increasingly speculative environments.
Finally, we produce a combined prediction model driven by the level of spe-
culation, aligning with Bates and Granger (1969) who conclude that when more
than one predictive model is available, it is rarely (if ever) optimal to use a single
6












1 if W t < W ̺






1 if W t ≥ W ̺
0 if W t < W ̺
,
with Wt denoting the Working’s T for day t, and W̺ denoting the chosen percentile
Working’s T cutoff value. We hereafter refer to this model as Combo.
We now outline our data sources. Gold GC1-GC4 prices are from the CME
Group and obtained through the Quandl platform. These generic futures contracts
are rolled on their last trading day and prices are not adjusted. The fundamental
factors utilised are daily VIX quotes from the CBOE, S&P500 values retrieved
from Yahoo! Finance, and the Trade Weighted US Dollar Index and US Economic
Policy Uncertainty Index, from FRED. Furthermore, to calculate the Working’s
T ratio, the Futures Only Disaggregated Commitment of Traders (DCoT) report
is retrieved from the CFTC. When adopting the report we specify the category
Producers, Merchants, Processors and Users (PMPU) as the hedgers and the ca-
tegory Money Manager as the speculators. This removes the swap dealers, which
are not traditional hedgers in this sense, as they are likely to be gold mining com-
panies or other firms directly related to dealing with the commodity gold. For
our later robustness checks, we obtain the US Treasury 1 Year Zero-Coupon yield
from FRED, and the generic continuous 2nd month WTI oil price (CL2) from the
CME Group. As the Commitment of Traders report is released on a weekly basis,
previous studies have assumed that the Working’s T speculation signal spans the
week-long period. However, we instead retain only days corresponding to weekly
DCoT report releases, avoiding the need to make such an assumption. As the
DCoT report is released each Turesday, only data from these days are retained.
Furthermore, the use of weekly data frequency minimises the impact of volati-
lity clustering, heteroscedasticity and excess kurtosis that is often associated with
daily data. This leads to a sample that is studied at a weekly frequency from June
2006 to April 2018.
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2.1 Principal Component Analysis
PCA is based on the concept of utilising a smaller set of unobservable latent
statistical factors to explain the systematic behaviour of a larger set of varia-
bles that we observe. Mechanically, the PCA procedure transforms p correlated
variables to an orthogonal system of variables with the aim of replicating the ori-
ginal variance-covariance correlation matrix as closely as possible. The variance-
covariance structure that we wish to capture in this paper is the relationship that
links together gold futures contract prices of varying maturities. As in Chantziara
and Skiadopoulos (2008), we apply the PCA approach to the daily first differences
in commodity futures price term structure. To improve methodological clarity we
adopt their notational conventions below also.
With time being denoted as t = 1, . . . , T and p representing the number of va-
riables, PCA proceeds by constructing a small number of statistical components
that are linear combinations of the (Tx1) dimensioned x vectors and are orthogo-
nal to one another. As stated above the goal for these components is to explain
as much of the original correlation or variance/covariance matrix as possible. The
first statistical variable, or first principal component (PC), is constructed following
this maximisation principal. The second PC then seeks to explain as much of the
remaining variance as possible but it has the additional constraint that it must be
uncorrelated to the first. This continues for p principal components. Representing
this process in matrix notation, we say that:
Z = XA,
with X representing a Txp dimension matrix of PCs, and A a pxp dimen-
sion matrix of corresponding PC loadings. Implementing the constraint on our
maximisation leads to:
(X′X − Il)A = 0,
with li denoting the Lagrange multipliers and I indicating a pxp dimension
identity matrix. From this, it can be seen that the PCA process essentially involves
calculating eigenvalues (li) and eignvectors (A) of the variance-covariance matrix
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S = X′X. Moreover, the ith eigenvalue corresponds to the variance of the ith
PC, and the cumulative variance of the X variables corresponds to the cumulative
variance of the PCs uncovered.
What is generally observed with empirical data is that a small number of PCs
can explain a large proportion of variance in the original data. In such a situation
the remaining components are generally ignored, leading to a great reduction in





with ε(r) being a (Txp) matrix of residuals and X, Z and A, now having r
columns.
There are a number of different approaches to deciding the size of r. The most
common is the use of a threshold of total variance that must be explained, for
instance, retain PCs that account for 90% of total variance. Another common
approach is to stop increasing r, once a component contributes less than 5% to
total explained variance. A more formal but less commonly employed approach is
to make use of statistical frameworks, including Horn (1965) and Glorfied (1995)’s
parallel analysis test approach, as we also consider. As stated by Chantziara and
Skiadopoulos (2008) the ultimate decision should be made using a combination of
factors, including the use of formal and informal rules and the interpretation of
the uncovered components.
This general principal component modelling approach is shown by Stock and
Watson (2002) to provide consistent estimators of the inherent latent factors, which
can be deployed effectively in a linear regression setting. Furthermore, the fore-
casts that arise from the use of PCA in a regression setting such as this, converge
to the forecasts from a specification where the latent factors are in fact known.
Despite these principal component factors not being specified with a clear econo-
mic interpretation a priori, they are said to encompass all information about the
unknown factors that drive the future term structure process. For these reasons,
we use the r principal components as factors to model and forecast the dynamics
of the gold futures price curve for various contract maturities in a parsimonious
manner, as per the specification in PC model described in Section 2. Furthermore,
given the imprecision in chosing the “correct” number of principal component fac-
9
Table 1: PC Regression Estimates
Dependent variable:
Gold Contracts
GC1 GC2 GC3 GC4
PC1 0.570∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PC2 −0.404∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ −0.473∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
PC3 0.572∗∗∗ −0.463∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ −0.555∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007)
Constant −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Observations 621 621 621 621
R2 0.998 0.995 0.995 0.998
Adjusted R2 0.998 0.995 0.995 0.998
This table presents OLS regression estimation results when fitting the factors from the PC model to each maturity gold
futures (GC1 - GC4) contemporaneously over the June 2006 to April 2018 period at a weekly frequency. In the table *
denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1%
level.
tors, as outline above, we show that our findings are robust to alternative choices
of r in Section 4.
3 Empirical Results
We include fitted regression results using the variables from the PC model as
independent factors in Table 1. The average adjusted R² value across the gold
futures contracts stands at 99.65%, indicating that latent factors extracted to
explain the maximum levels of variation in the data, can also comprehensively
explain gold futures prices when cast in a contemporaneous linear regression set-
ting. Table 2 shows the linear regression results using the fundamental variables
from the Macro model, with its a priori specified macroeconomic factors leading
to an adjusted R² value in the 12.6% to 16.4% range. More importantly, the accu-
racy of each of the families of factors to predict future observations is assessed
for the 2006-2018 period with the associated Root Mean Squared Errors (RMSE)
and Mean Absolute Errors (MAE) presented in Table 3. Directly comparing the
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Table 2: Macro Regression Estimates
Dependent variable:
Gold Contracts
GC1 GC2 GC3 GC4
SP500 −0.188∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.049) (0.051) (0.060)
VIX −0.018∗ −0.007 −0.009 −0.016∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
USD −1.185∗∗∗ −1.065∗∗∗ −1.059∗∗∗ −1.195∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.096) (0.100) (0.118)
Eco Policy −0.0003 0.0002 −0.0004 0.0004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant −0.001 −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.001
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001)
Observations 621 621 621 621
R2 0.131 0.169 0.158 0.143
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.164 0.152 0.138
This table presents OLS regression estimation results when fitting the factors from the Macro model to each maturity
gold futures (GC1 - GC4) contemporaneously over the June 2006 to April 2018 period at a weekly frequency. In the
table * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the
1% level.
Table 3: Performance Metrics
GC1 GC2 GC3 GC4
PC RMSE 0.0144 0.0112 0.0116 0.0138
PC MAE 0.0091 0.0083 0.0084 0.0088
Macro RMSE 0.0143 0.0111 0.0115 0.0137
Macro MAE 0.0090 0.0083 0.0084 0.0088
RW RMSE 0.0210 0.0160 0.0167 0.0201
RW MAE 0.0131 0.0117 0.0120 0.0126
This table presents Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and Mean Absolute Error (MAE) loss functions for the PC,
Macro and Random Walk (RW) models for each maturity gold futures (GC1 - GC4) over the June 2006 to April 2018
period at a weekly frequency. The results of a two-tailed t-test to determine statistically significant differences between
the PC and Macro models performance measures are indicated with asterisks (*). * denotes significance at the 10%
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 4: Speculation Subsample Errors
Percentile Working’s T PC RMSE PC MAE Macro RMSE Macro MAE
Least speculative periods
50% <1.1167 0.01224 0.00944 0.01221 0.00940
60% <1.1722 0.01298 0.00928 0.01291 0.00922
70% <1.2121 0.01365 0.00941 0.01349 0.00932
80% <1.3338 0.01378 0.00931 0.01364 0.00923
90% <1.5731 0.01335 0.00906 0.01323 0.00901
Most speculative periods
50% ≥1.1167 0.01338 0.00789 0.01321 0.00787
60% ≥1.1722 0.01259 0.00773 0.01243 0.00775
70% ≥1.2121 0.01066 0.00692 0.01071 0.00703
80% ≥1.3338 0.00793 0.00606 0.00808 0.00624
90% ≥1.5731 0.00633 0.00509 0.00651 0.00528
This table presents RMSE and MAE, the RMSE and MAE loss functions averaged over the GC1-GC4 (gold futures).
The loss functions are presented for the PC and Macro factors using subsample periods split according to increasing
percentile Working’s T (1960) ratio values as given in the Working’s T column. Specifically, observations with a
calculated Working’s T value greater than or equal to the 50-90th percentile level are labelled “most speculative” with
the remaining observations being referred to as “least speculative”.
errors, the performance of the PC and Macro factors are very similar. The higher
errors associated with the naive Random Walk benchmark is a suggestion that
both models achieve a predictive accuracy beyond what would occur by chance
alone. The difficulty of beating this Random Walk model when predicting gold
prices is highlighted by Hassani et al. (2015). A tractable t-test fails to yield
any instances of statistically significant differences between PC and Macro factors
across the gold futures. The results here can be interpreted as an indication that
the predictions that arise from the unconstrained statistical factors we uncover
closely mirror those from the fundamental variables that are explicitly identified
and incorporated into the Macro model.
We now introduce our measure of speculation to assess if it can inform which
variables most accurately determine gold futures returns. We classify days with
calculated Working’s T index ratios of greater than or equal to the 50th, 60th,
70th, 80th and 90th percentile full sample ratios respectively, as “most speculative”,
with all the remaining days being classified as “ least speculative”. As an illustrative
example, using the 90th percentile value, we classify the 62 weekly observations
with Working’s T ratios of greater than or equal to 1.5731 as the “most speculative”
12
Table 5: Composite Model Errors
Overall GC1 GC2 GC3 GC4
Combo RMSE 0.01271 0.01429 0.01111 0.01151 0.01365
Combo MAE 0.00861 0.00901 0.00828 0.00838 0.00878
PC RMSE 0.01282** 0.01441* 0.01121 0.01162 0.01376
PC MAE 0.00866* 0.00906 0.00833 0.00844 0.00882
Macro RMSE 0.01272*** 0.01430 0.01112* 0.01152* 0.01366*
Macro MAE 0.00863*** 0.00902 0.00831** 0.00841* 0.00880
The predictive accuracy of the PC, Macro, and Combo models over the June 2006 to April 2018 period for each
maturity GC (gold futures) at a weekly frequency are given. “Overall” denotes the performance metric value averaged
across all of the GC1-GC4 maturities, (MAE and RMSE). The results of a t-test of statistically significantly
outperformance for the Combo model over the Macro and PC models respectively, are indicated with asterisks (*) in
the Macro and PC columns. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and ***
denotes significance at the 1% level.
subsample, with the remaining 558 weekly observations for each generic futures
contract, being classified as the “ least speculative” sample.
Table 4 presents the calculated performance metrics associated with these spe-
culation informed subsample splits. Initially turning our attention to the least
speculative subsamples, we observe that for the 80th and 90th percentile least
speculative Working’s T splits, the Macro factors achieve slightly lower errors than
the PC factors. In contrast, the errors associated with the most speculative 10%
subsample period is lower for the PC model than the Macro model with RMSE
values of 0.00633 vs. 0.00651. The inference here is that during periods charac-
terised by increased levels of speculator participation it is advantageous to model
gold futures using latent factors, with Macro factors most accurately capturing
prices during the least speculative periods.
As a means of further examining this phenomenon we construct a simple com-
posite prediction model (Combo model) comprised of the PC prediction for days
associated with calculated Working’s T ratios equal to or above the 90th percentile
figure, and the Macro model prediction for each of the other days in the sample.
Table 5 presents the RMSE and MAE performance metrics for each of the models.
Across the full futures curve the Combo model significantly outperforms both the
PC and Macro models using the MAE performance measure. We find that swit-
ching from Macro to latent factors during the most speculative periods results in a
large number of instances of significantly improved predictions, versus employing
either model in isolation.
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Figure 1 shows the Working’s T ratio and the gold price across our sample.
This figure suggest that periods of greater speculative participation corresponds
to more stable gold prices. In order to investigate whether this is the case, we
construct a measure of realized volatility as in Brunetti et al. (2016), where the







Our measure of realized volatility of gold prices is also graphed in Figure 1. The
correlation between our monthly measure of realized volatility and the monthly
average of our weekly measure of Working’s T is -0.165, again suggesting that
periods of increased speculation correspond to lower gold price volatility in our
sample.
3.1 Discussion of Results
Our results suggest that during periods of elevated levels of speculative activity,
the ability of macroeconomic factors to accurately explain changes in gold fu-
tures prices weakens, and latent principal component factors do a better job of
accounting for the added dynamics introduced by high levels of speculation. As
a result, a composite prediction framework that switches from macroeconomic to
latent principal component variables in times of greater speculator participation is
a more accurate predictor of gold futures prices. Additionally, our findings suggest
that increased speculation correlates with decreased price volatility. This supports
the findings of Brunetti et al. (2016) and Kim (2015) for energy and agricultural
markets, but is in contrast to the suggestion that speculation has a potentially
destabilizing effect for precious metals (Bosch and Pradkhan, 2015). Together,
these results suggest that high levels of speculative trading corresponds to prices
that are more stable than fundamentals are able to fully explain, in contrast to
the assumption made by Gogolin and Kearney (2016) for oil futures.
These results raise the interesting question: What are the dynamics added by
elevated levels of speculation that appear to push prices away from what funda-
mentals would predict? More specifically, why do prices appear to be more stable
during periods of relatively high levels of speculation? There could be a number
of explanations for this finding. Firstly, this finding could support the traditional
view that speculators reduce volatility by trading counter cyclically; dampening
14
This figure presents in the upper panel a line plot of the GC1 gold price evolution over the June 2006 to April 2018
period, along with its associated 4 week realized volatility measure. In the lower panel, the figure presents a plot of the
level of speculator participation as measured by the Working’s T index value, again over the June 2006 to April 2018
period.
Figure 1: Gold Price and Level of Speculation
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Table 6: PC Variance
PC1 PC2 PC3
Standard deviation 0.025 0.007 0.004
Proportion of Variance 0.902 0.076 0.019
Cumulative Proportion 0.902 0.978 0.997
This table presents the results of the principal component decomposition for F1t−1, F2t−1, and F3t−1 for GC1-GC4
(gold futures) over the June 2006 to April 2018 period.
rather than accentuating price increases or decreases (Friedman, 1953). Prices
may also be affected by elevated levels of speculative trading due to its associated
impact on market microstructure. As a result, price changes that cannot be fully
explained by fundamentals may be trading induced (Webb 2012). Kim (2015)
finds some evidence that speculative trading in the futures market does have a
positive effect on commodity market liquidity as measured by the effective spread
and corresponds to lower volatility. A further explanation for our result could be
that constraints imposed on speculative traders limit their ability to fully react to
changes in fundamental news. If news is positive and a speculative trader faces
position limits, this may prevent them from adding to their net position, thus
reducing the ability to drive prices as high as may be expected. Therefore, posi-
tion constraints may influence the relationship between news and returns (Smales
2014).
4 Other Specifications
In this Section, we test the sensitivity of our result to alternative latent and
macroeconomic specifications. Firstly, we deal with the number of principal com-
ponents retained for the latent factor specification. Up to now, we have retained
three principal components; in line with Ulrich (2000) who interpret the compo-
nents as the parallel level, slope, and curvature of the futures curve. Figure 2
demonstrates how the principal component loadings vary across our gold futures
curve, broadly matching Ulrich’s (2000) interpretation of level, slope, and curva-
ture. However, other common approaches include Glorfield’s (1995) extension of
Horn’s (1965) technique; and stopping once a component contributes less than
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Figure 2: Principal Component Factor Correlations


















Figure 3: Glorfield (1995) Test Parallel Analysis
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Table 7: Robustness Checks
Alt Macro 1 PC 2 PC
Combo RMSE 0.01269 0.01271 0.01271
Combo MAE 0.00860 0.00862 0.00861
PC RMSE 0.01283*** 0.01285*** 0.01283***
PC MAE 0.00866** 0.00868** 0.00866
Macro RMSE 0.0127*** 0.01272** 0.01272***
Macro MAE 0.00862*** 0.00863** 0.00863***
This table presents the predictive accuracy of the PC, Macro, and Combo models using Alt Macro (Alternative Macro
specification), 1 PC (Latent model with only 1 principal component, F1t−1, specified), and 2 PC (Latent model with 2
principal components, F1t−1 and F2t−1, specified), specifications. RMSE and MAE, represent the RMSE and MAE
loss functions averaged across each of the GC1-GC4 (gold futures) over the June 2006 to April 2018 period at a weekly
data frequency. The results of a t-test of statistically significantly outperformance for the Combo model over the Macro
and PC models respectively, are indicated with asterisks (*) in the Macro and PC columns. * denotes significance at
the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
components are retained using these approaches. For this reason, we assess, 1 PC :
GCτt = α+ β1F1t−1 + εt,
and 2 PC :
GCτt = α+ β1F1t−1 + β2F2t−1 + εt,
respectively, as alternative latent models. Secondly, we test for sensitivity to our
precise fundamental specification for gold futures through the addition of both oil
and interest rates factors, as identified by O’Connor et al., (2015). This leads to
an alternative macroeconomic model (Alt Macro) that mitigates possible omitted
variable bias:
GCτt = α+β1 SP500t−1+β2 V IXt−1+β3 USDt−1+β4 EcPolt−1+β5 CLt−1+β6 T t−1+εt,
where CL represents the generic continuous 2nd month (CL2) WTI oil future log
return and T represents the US Treasury 1 Year Zero-Coupon yield.4
Table 7 shows us the results (aggregated across the futures curve) of these
alternative specifications. Widespread significance is uncovered at the 5% and 1%
levels for the alternative latent and macro factor specifications. These additional
robustness tests support our findings that during periods of elevated levels of
4Given the inverse link between interest rates and inflation, our alternative model specification
could also be interpreted as indirectly incorporating inflation as a factor driving gold futures
prices.
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speculative activity, the ability of macroeconomic factors to accurately explain
changes in gold futures prices weakens, and the proposed speculation informed
composite prediction model outperforms in gold futures markets.
5 Conclusion
Extant studies provide contradictory evidence about the impact of speculation
on futures returns, volatility, and the relationship between market fundamentals
and prices. Much of this research has focused on energy and agricultural markets,
with very little addressing gold, which, as evidenced by the size of the market is
a very important commodity from an investor’s perspective. We add to the un-
derstanding of the implications of speculation in futures markets, and specifically,
the gold futures market, by focusing on the effect of speculation on the predictive
accuracy of both fundamental macroeconomic and latent principal component fa-
milies of factors. We find that during periods characterised by elevated levels of
speculative activity, the ability of macroeconomic factors to accurately explain
changes in gold futures prices diminishes relative to latent factors.
This paper therefore provides an empirical demonstration that in gold futures
markets, high levels of speculation lead to an injection of additional dynamics that
cannot be explained by traditional macroeconomic fundamentals. This supports
the findings of Bertus and Stanhouse (2001) and Smales (2014), that show spe-
culation can drive prices in the gold market away from their fundamentals. We
then demonstrate significant outperformance using a composite prediction frame-
work that switches from macroeconomic to latent principal component variables
in times of greater speculator participation. This result is shown to be robust to a
number of alternative latent and fundamental model specifications. Additionally,
our findings indicate that increased speculation correlates with decreased price
volatility, supporting the findings of Brunetti et al. (2016) and Kim (2015) for
energy and agricultural markets, but run contrary to the suggestion of Bosch and
Pradkhan (2015) that speculation has a potentially destabilizing effect for precious
metals. These results suggest that high levels of speculation correspond to prices
that are more stable than fundamentals are able to fully explain, in contrast to the
assumption made by Gogolin and Kearney (2016) for oil futures. Future research
should examine whether this relationship between high levels of speculation, in-
formational content of fundamental macroeconomic variables, and price stability
19
is consistent across futures markets. Finally, future research should establish the
exact factors that cause the relationship between prices and fundamental variables
to break down during elevated periods of speculation.
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